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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-3560 
_____________ 
 
ROSALIND NORMAN, 
                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KMART CORPORATION, T/D/B/A Kmart and Super Kmart; 
KMART MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, T/D/B/A Kmart and Super Kmart;  
KMART OF PENNSYLVANIA LP, T/D/B/A Kmart and Super Kmart;  
SEARS HOLDING CORP., T/D/B/A Kmart and Super Kmart 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:07-cv-02222) 
District Judge: Honorable James Munley 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 22, 2012 
 
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: June 27, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Rosalind Norman was a store manager at a Pennsylvania Kmart when she was 
terminated for manipulating payroll records and engaging in fraudulent behavior.  She 
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filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
alleging that she was terminated because of her age and gender.  After discovery, the 
District Court granted Kmart’s motion for summary judgment dismissing all of her 
claims.  Norman appeals and we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts relevant to 
our conclusion.  Rosalind Norman was the store manager at the Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania Kmart until July 2005, when she was fired for payroll manipulation and 
fraud.  An investigation into Norman’s conduct revealed that she requested employees to 
work off the clock,1 compensated them with cash vouchers or personal time, allowed 
them to be clocked-in when they were not working, and paid nonemployees to work.2
                                                 
1 Working off the clock refers to working without punching into the required time 
recording system. 
  
Norman admitted to these actions in her deposition and in writing.  Appendix (“App.”) at 
67, 1240, 1247.  These actions violated Kmart’s policy against fraud, which forbids 
“[f]alse, fictitious, or misleading entries or reports,” App. at 1276, and its prohibition on 
manipulation of payroll expenses, which forbids “allowing associates to work off the 
clock, manipulating time clock punches to reduce hours worked, and deferring the 
payment of any wages through the use of cash vouchers,” App. at 1320.  
 
2 Norman admittedly engaged in these activities in order to meet her payroll budget.  
App. at 67.  Paying employees with cash vouchers and personal time allowed Norman to 
compensate them without increasing payroll expenditures.  
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Because of the seriousness and extent of these violations, Norman was terminated.  
She was 54 years old at the time.  After her termination, Kmart hired Frank Mussich, an 
older male, to replace Norman.3
 After being terminated, despite having admitted in her deposition that she believed 
she was treated more harshly than older employees, Norman pointed to younger 
employees and male employees who she believed committed similar violations but were 
not terminated.  However, these employees each committed either one of the several 
violations Norman committed, did not actually commit any violations, or acted at 
Norman’s direction.  
  He worked for approximately one year before leaving 
Kmart on his own accord for medical reasons.  
 Norman filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania against Kmart, asserting it terminated her because of her age and 
gender in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“Title 
VII”).  The District Court granted Kmart’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed 
Norman’s claims.  This appeal followed.4
II. 
 
Our review of a District Court order granting summary judgment is plenary.  
Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000).  As there is no direct 
                                                 
3 The record does not indicate Mussich’s age, only that he was older than Norman. 
 
4 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as an appeal of a final order of the District 
Court.   
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evidence of discrimination, we apply the three-part burden-shifting framework from 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to Norman’s ADEA and Title 
VII claims.  Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., Parkview Hosp. Div., 60 F.3d 153, 157 
(3d Cir. 1995).  Under this framework, the plaintiff first must carry the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.   
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of 
production shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the plaintiff was terminated for 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.  Id. at 802.  Lastly, “should the defendant 
carry this burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were 
not the true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”  Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 
198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).5
A. 
 
 Kmart has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its 
termination of Norman, and has thus satisfied the second prong of the burden-shifting 
framework.  Kmart put forth evidence that Norman repeatedly manipulated payroll 
expenses and engaged in fraudulent behavior as the reason she was terminated.  These 
infractions suffice as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination, which has 
                                                 
5 We will assume Norman established a prima facie case of age and gender 
discrimination, and thus we will only discuss the second two prongs of the McDonnell 
Douglas test.  Although the District Court only opined on the prima facie element, “[w]e 
may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 
186 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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no relation to her age or gender, because Kmart is explicit that they can result in 
termination.  See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) 
(finding employee’s failure to keep accurate records and adhere to general work rules 
amounted to a legitimate reason for termination); see also Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. 
Corp., 391 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that evidence of employee’s violations of 
company policies sufficed as proof employer would have fired employee without 
consideration of her age).  
B.  
Norman fails to introduce any evidence that sufficiently demonstrates that Kmart’s 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her was a pretext.  To do so, 
Norman must point to evidence from which a jury could reasonably “(1) disbelieve the 
employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s 
action.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  She need not introduce 
evidence beyond her prima facie case, but must point to “weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate 
reasons” to show that they were not the true motivation.  Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. 
of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr 
and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)) (citation and internal quotation mark 
omitted).   
Norman fails to show that it is more likely than not that Kmart’s stated reason for 
firing her was a pretext.  First, because Norman admits to the violations she committed, 
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she cannot show that Kmart’s reason was false.  She also offers no direct or indirect 
evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to find Kmart’s real motivation for 
terminating her was her age or gender.  Norman contends that similarly situated 
employees were treated more favorably than she was, but the employees to whom 
Norman points were not similarly situated because they either were her subordinates or 
did not commit violations of the same scope and scale as she.  See Maxfield v. Cintas 
Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding two employees not similarly 
situated when they were not similar in “all relevant respects”); see also Vernon v. A& L 
Motors, 381 F. App’x. 164, 167 (3d. Cir. 2010) (finding identification of a similarly 
situated individual may give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination). 
Because Norman is unable to point to any inconsistencies or contradictions in 
Kmart’s proffered reason and has failed to bring forth any other evidence that would 
permit a reasonable factfinder to find that this explanation was a pretext, she has failed to 
meet her burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework.  
III.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the opinion and order of the District 
Court.  
